Study Warns California’s Energy Retreat Threatens U.S. Military Readiness

California’s declining oil production, shrinking refinery capacity, and growing dependence on overseas fuel supplies pose a serious threat to U.S. military readiness in the Pacific, according to a September 14 study coauthored by Dr. James Rector. An expert on in-state oil production who has spoken at several CIPA events, Rector joined USC’s Michael Mische and researcher Joseph Silvi in examining these vulnerabilities and recommending a comprehensive federal response.

The study, Addressing U.S. National Security Vulnerabilities Created by California Oil and Refinery Policies: The Need for a Rapid Response Fuel Reserve, connects California’s energy policies to a question with consequences far beyond the state’s borders: whether the United States can reliably fuel sustained military operations during a major Pacific conflict.

The authors report that more than 61 percent of the crude oil processed by California refineries comes from foreign sources. California also increasingly relies on imported gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel as domestic refining capacity contracts. Overseas supplies depend on maritime transportation routes that can be interrupted by conflict, attacks, shipping constraints, or disruptions at strategic chokepoints.

At the same time, California lacks inbound crude pipelines connecting it to production elsewhere in the United States and has no direct pipeline access to the Gulf Coast Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The authors describe California, Nevada, and, to a lesser extent, Arizona as a “petroleum island,” dependent on a regional production and distribution system supplemented by ocean shipments.

That isolation carries particular significance for national defense. California is a principal domestic staging area for military operations in the Pacific, and its fuel infrastructure serves installations throughout the Southwest. The study identifies Naval Base San Diego, Camp Pendleton, Edwards Air Force Base, Travis Air Force Base, Naval Air Station Lemoore, and installations in Nevada and Arizona among the facilities dependent on this regional network.

The authors warn that a major conflict could simultaneously interrupt foreign crude shipments, restrict imports of finished fuels, and threaten forward military fuel depots in Guam, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. Under those circumstances, the military would need a dependable domestic system capable of supplying fuel immediately and replenishing inventories over an extended period.

The study concludes that California’s declining production and refining capacity have weakened that capability. It attributes the decline in part to policies affecting drilling, workovers, enhanced recovery, pipelines, and long-term refinery investment. In the authors’ assessment, those constraints leave the remaining system less able to replace interrupted imports or rapidly increase military fuel production.

Their principal recommendation is a federally controlled California Rapid Response Fuel Reserve. Depending on the duration and intensity of military operations, the authors estimate that the reserve could require approximately 22.8 million to 53.4 million barrels of crude oil and 961 million to 2.2 billion gallons of finished military fuels. These are planning estimates developed for the study, rather than established military requirements.

The proposed reserve would encompass much more than storage tanks. The authors recommend integrating increased California crude production, expanded storage, additional refinery output, improved pipeline capacity, and coordinated military distribution. Stored fuel could provide the initial response to an emergency, while domestic production and refining would sustain operations and replenish depleted inventories.

Specific recommendations include developing petroleum resources from federal military lands where feasible, using extended-reach drilling and modern reservoir technology; evaluating the restoration of idled California refinery and pipeline infrastructure; and constructing a refinery near Las Vegas connected to Bakersfield by separate crude and finished-product pipelines. Storage would be dispersed among refineries, terminals, pipeline facilities, ports, and military installations to reduce the consequences of losing any single facility.

The authors propose using the Defense Production Act to establish and coordinate the system. They acknowledge that projects would still face ownership, permitting, infrastructure, and other implementation challenges. Their recommendations represent a proposed strategy, not an approved federal program.

For CIPA members, the study reinforces the national importance of preserving California’s production and refining capabilities. Local crude supplies, experienced oil workers, functioning pipelines, and dependable refineries are strategic assets that take years to develop and cannot be replaced quickly during a crisis.

California’s independent producers stand ready to contribute to a stronger domestic energy system. The study makes the case that supporting their continued operation serves consumers, sustains California jobs, and protects the infrastructure on which military readiness depends. State leaders should weigh those national security consequences when making decisions about the future of in-state oil production.